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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-- - ------- -DOUGLAS L. SCHMIDT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 16097

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, KENWAY ENGINEERING
and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action arises from an application filed with the
Industrial Commission of Utah seeking Workmen's Compensation
Benefits.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon hearing, the administrative law judge ordered that
plaintiff's claim should be denied.

Thereafter, upon plain-

tiff's Motion for Review the Industrial Commission permitted
plaintiff to file additional medical records and then, upon
review of all of the evidence, the entire Industrial Commission
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affirmed the order of denial as entered by the administrative
law judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Defendants seek affirmation of the decision of the administrative law judge and the order of the Industrial Commission
affirming that decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the facts as stated in the Plaintiff's Brief are
incomplete and somewhat misstated or improperly characterized,
defendants submit the following additional statement of facts.
The plaintiff has experienced problems with his back
and received medical treatment therefor by Dr. Hubert C.
Burton since he was in the ninth grade about eight or nine
years ago (R., p. 9).

He testified that these problems and

treatment continued up until about a year and a half prior
to the Industrial Commission hearing which can be calculated
to be approximately September, 1976 (R., p. 10).
Plaintiff claims that he ceased having back problems at
about that time which was just prior to obtaining the employment with defendant Kenway Engineering (R., p. 30).

He

started work for Kenway on October 24, 1976 and was assigned
the duty of cutting pieces of steel into specific lengths
for use in other areas of the shop (R., pp. 11, 30).
At the Commission hearing held on March 16, 1978, the
claimant testified that beginning in about mid-December,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-2Machine-generated OCR,
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1976 he noticed a stiffness in his back which, by January,
1977 had developed into a definite soreness (R., pp. 14-16).
He could not identify any specific occasion in which he
experienced the pain or stiffness nor is there any indication
in the record to show any particular activity in which the
plaintiff was engaged at the time it first started (R., pp.
14-15).
The plaintiff continued working through January and did
not go to Dr. Burton until February 7, 1977 when the soreness
in his back had become worse.

(R., pp. 15, 37).

Pursuant

to examinations and x-rays made at that time, the claimant
was diagnosed as having a problem with his appendix and in
March, 1977 his appendix was removed (R., pp. 17-18).
Following a post-operative recovery period of about
six weeks he returned to work at Kenway where he continued
working until late June,

1977 (R., p. 18).

In June, 1977

he again consulted Dr. Burton concerning continuing problems
with his back.

Dr. Burton referred him to Dr. Affleck who

performed surgery on the plaintiff's back on July 19, 1977
(R., pp.

19-20, 84).

The applicant did not give any notice of any claimed
industrial accident nor did he make a claim for any Workmen's
Compensation Benefits referable to his back condition until
June,

1977 (R., pp.

13, 21, 22, 30, 32).

At that time an

Employer's First Report of Injury, dated June 7, 1977, was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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prepared indicating that the date of injury was "unknown"
(Exhibit B-4, R., p. 61).

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a

form requesting a change in physicians and, in describing
the accident stated, "It is a congenital low back disorder
that bas become symptomatic under the stress of lifting
steel" (R., p. 78).
The plaintiff then filed his application for hearing
with the Industrial Commission in which he indicated that
his claimed accident occurred in February, 1977.

The

specific date was left blank and the applicant claimed
therein that he "developed acute low back pain" under the
stress of lifting (emphasis added)(R., p. 2, 32).
At the Industrial Commission hearing the plaintiff
confirmed that the soreness in his back which he experienced
in January and February of 1977 was developmental in nature
and increased with time (R., pp. 16-17).

He quite candidly

admitted that he could not identify any event which caused
his back to become sore.

The claimant testified pursuant to

questioning of his own counsel:

Q.

Do you recall any such occasion in which
you experienced this kind of pain or stiffness in your back.

A.

Any particular date?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Not exactly, no.

(R., p.

15).
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Then upon cross-examination the plaintiff testified:
Q.

In June,
not able
of event
pened to

1977, isn't it true that you were
at that time to specify any kind
or date upon which anything hapcause your back to become sore?

A.

That's true.

(R., p. 33).

And on further cross-examination the applicant testified:
Q.

Mr. Schmidt, isn't it true that you really
cannot relate the onset on your back pain
to any particular event that occurred
while you were working for Kenway?

A.

That's true.

(R., p. 37).

These admissions on the part of the plaintiff were con~rt

firmed in the testimony of Mr.

Mann who had taken the

recorded statement of the plaintiff in June, 1977.

Mr. Mann

testified:
Q.

(By Mr. Poelman) Fine.
During the course
of your conversation with him did you inquire of him as to when he first started
feeling any pain in his back during the
period he had been employed by Kenway?

A.

I did.

Q.

What did he tell you?

A.

The month of January.

Q.

1977?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you inquire of him as to whether
he could identify any incident which
caused the onset of that pain?

A.

I did.
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Q.

What did he say?

A.

He said no.

(R., p. 48).

Plaintiff's denial of any specific episode which caused
problems to his back is also contained in the medical record.
Dr. Affleck's office notes generated by his examination of
the plaintiff on June 22, 1977 indicate:
This is a 21 year old boy who has had trouble
since February or before that even, when he
noticed in his work that he was having increased
back pain. There was not a specific episode of
difficulty, only that his work was noted frequently to cause pain in the back and in the
right lower limb.
(Emphasis added)(R., p. 76).
It is also noted in the July 17, 1977 history taken as part
of the hospital record:
This is a 21 year old white male who had gradual
onset on low back pain while working on the job.
He did not think too much of it and he did not
have a given serious injury on any one day--just
noticed that he was getting progressively more
back pain each day as he did moderately heavy work
• • • subsequent x-rays revealing spondylolysis.
(Emphasis added)(R., p. 87).
The only specific events noted in the record which
could be identified by the plaintiff were the bumping
of his knee on two separate occasions in mid-December,
1976.

He testified that on one occasion n • . • I

stumbled backwards and caught my knee on the underside
of the saw tablen

(R., p. 13).

He did not report that

incident to his employer nor is there any indication that he
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experienced any problem with his back in relation thereto.
On the second occasion, a few days later, he indicated that,
while walking past the discard pile, he bumped his knee on a
piece of steel that was sticking out of a waste can (R., p.
14).

This event was reported to the employer, but again,

there was no indication that the episode had any effect on
the plaintiff's back.
The plaintiff also testified that it is a normal occurrence for the employees to experience some jarring effect
while handling the steel but such was characterized as a
normal activity and plaintiff did not define any specific
instance in which he experienced any adverse effects therefrom.

Based upon this evidence the administrative law judge

issued his Findings of Facts, Conclusions and Order concluding that plaintiff had not met his burden of proving that an
accident had occurred.

The Industrial Commission affirmed

this decision after reviewing the evidence (R., p. 121).

It

is a review of this Order and the Findings of the administrative law judge that is sought here (R., pp. 70-72); Appendix
A1-A3).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUSTAIN AN ACCIDENT
ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
In approaching its review of this case, the Court
should not lose sight of the standard of review imposed upon
the court by statute.

Section 35-1-84, Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended) limits this Court's review to a determination of whether or not the Commission acted without or in
excess of its powers or whether the Commission's findings do
not support the award.

It is well established that the Com-

mission's Findings of Fact shall not be vacated by this Court
if there is some competent evidence of record which provides
a reasonable basis to support such findings.

Evans v.

Industrial Commission, 502 P.2d 118 (Utah 1972); Hackford v.
Industrial Commission, 380 P.2d 927 (Utah 1963).

Thus, this

Court should not engage in an attempt to weigh or evaluate
the evidence of record except to determine whether there is
some competent evidence to justify the Commission's order.
Likewise, the Court should keep in mind that the burden
of proof or persuasion in an Industrial Commission case is
upon the applicant and the Industrial Commission has the
sole prerogative of weighing the evidence in order to
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determine whether or not that burden has been met.

Justice

Wolfe has identified the applicant's burden as follows:
The rule that pertains in respect to a factual
situation is that the applicant has the burden
of proof in establishing his case.
If, after
all the facts are considered, the Commission
finds the scales in balance, the situation is
left in equipoise and the applicant cannot recover.
In order to recover the evidence must,
qualitatively and quantitatively considered,
weigh or proponderate in favor of the applicant.
Jones v. California Packing Corporation, 244
P.2d 640, 649 (Utah 1952)(Dissenting Opinion).
Applying these standards of proof and review, an analysis of the record clearly reveals that the Commission acted
within the boundaries of its authority and in accordance
with the evidence and that the Commission properly found
that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof.
The principal issue in this case is limited to a question of whether or not the Industrial Commission properly
found, within the bounds of its discretion, that the applicant had failed to prove that he had sustained an industrial
accident as is required by the Utah Workmen's Compensation
Act.

If this Court finds that the Commission did act

properly in finding that no industrial accident occurred,
then all other matters and issues raised in the Plaintiff's
Brief herein become irrelevant.
Defendants submit that a careful analysis of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated April
3, 1978 issued by the administrative law judge (Appendix
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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A1-A3) together with a review the record quite convincingly
demonstrate that the judge, and the Commission upon review,
ordered denial of the plaintiff's application based upon a
satisfactory and thorough analysis of the evidence and a
proper analysis of the law of this state.
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act awards compensation
only for injuries " • • •

£1

accident arising out of or in

the course of • . • employment • • • • "

(Emphasis added)

(Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).

It is thus

essential under the Utah Statute that an "accident" must
have occurred in connection with the applicant's employment
before recovery of benefits can be allowed.
The record in this case, as referenced in the foregoing
Statement of Facts, clearly shows that the plaintiff has
never been able to identify any accident which occurred in
connection with his employment relating to the onset of
his back problem.

Such was very candidly admitted by the

plaintiff to his employer when he first made claim for
benefits in June, 1977 (R., p. 61), when he filed his
application with the Industrial Commission (R., p.2), when
he gave a recorded statement to Mr. Mann in June, 1977 (R.,
p. 48), when he gave a history to Dr. Affleck on June 22,
1977 (R., p. 76), when he provided his doctor with a history
of his problem when admitted to the hospital in July, 1977
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(R., p. 87), and when he testified under oath at the Industrial Commission hearing on March 16, 1978 (R., pp. 33, 37).
Applicant's counsel has attempted to create a case for
the plaintiff by making reference to the fact that in
December, 1976, the plaintiff, on two different occasions,
sustained a trauma to his knee.

He asserts the possibility

that such events caused injury to the plaintiff's back
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7).

However, the record indicates

that the plaintiff himself could identify no adverse effect
on his back resulting from either of those two knee episodes,
even under the pressures of leading questions propounded by
his own counsel (R., pp. 13-15).
Obviously, the administrative law judge and the Commission were fully justified in finding that the plaintiff had
failed to produce evidence, beyond pure speculation, that
the plaintiff had sustained any identifiable industrial
accident which caused a back injury.
Plaintiff's counsel further speculates that perhaps
the normal and regular jarring effect to which all employees
are subject in the handling of the steel may have caused
some injury to the plaintiff's back (Appellant's Brief, pp.
10-11).

Again, however, the plaintiff specifically denied

being able to make any connection between that activity and
the onset of any kind of pain or stiffness in his back (R.,
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p.lS).

It should be noted that the plaintiff's testimony

with respect to such activity did not identify any specific
occasion on which he sustained any trauma.

Thus, the

Commission was quite proper in not finding the occurrence of
an industrial accident in connection with that activity and
the Commission further acted properly in determining that
the plaintiff had not produced any persuasive evidence to
show a causal connection between that activity and the onset
of the applicant's back problem.
The plaintiff's arguments on this review are defective
in two essential respects.

First, the plaintiff ignores the

standard of review imposed by statute upon this court and
urges this Court to require the Industrial Commission to
indulge itself in the plaintiff's asserted speculations.
In this connection it is submitted that the Industrial
Commission is not required to make findings in favor of a
applicant based upon speculative facts.

Quite to the

contrary, it has the prerogative of weighing the facts and
basing its decision upon any facts or showing contained in
the record which constitute any competent evidence.
Secondly, plaintiff bases his argument upon case law
which is both irrelevant and distinguishable from the facts
of the instant case.

It is noted that the plaintiff places

primary reliance upon the cases of Jones v. California
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Packing Corporation, 244 P.2d 640, 121 Utah 612 (1952)
and Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 503 P.2d 137, 28
utah 2d 368 (1972).

However, both the Jones and Elton cases

involve heart attacks which were sustained by the applicants
following their being subject to identifiable exertion and
stress.

Since it could be determined that such stress was

the cause of the heart failures and since the stress was
specifically identifiable as an event which occurred at a
particular time and place within the scope of the employment, this Court determined such to be compensable.
In the instant case, however, we are not dealing with a
heart failure but rather with a back injury.
This court has already recognized this to be a valid
distinction.

In Redman Warehousing Corporation v. Industrial

Commission, 22 Utah 2398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) in which a
back injury was also claimed, this Court stated:
Petitioner strongly urges that Jones v. California Packing Corp. supports his position
that the facts in the instant case reflect an
"accident" calling for compensation under the
act • • • • The Jones case has no kinship here,
since it was an exertion case involving a death
by heart failure as well as involving the continuing debate among medical men as to whether
exertion and/or the degree thereof is a factor
in causing heart failure.
454 P.2d at 286.
The Robertson, Memorial Hospital, Hammond and Powers
cases cited by plaintiff also involved on the job heart
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attacks (Appellant's Brief, p. 11).

In each case the attack

or death was casually connected to specific work activity.
There is no evidence in this case of any episode of
overexertion or abnormal stress to which the applicant was
subjected in connection with his employment and, most
importantly, the record in the instant case is void of the
identification of any particular event.

It should also be

noted that the Elton case does not involve a claim under the
workmen's Compensation Act and cannot fairly be construed to
be interpretative of the standards under that act.
Another case upon which the plaintiff places heavy
reliance in connection with this action is Purity Biscuit
Company v. Industrial Commission, 201 P.2d 961, 155 Utah 1
(1941).

However, the Purity Biscuit case is also clearly

distinguishable from the facts in the instant case.

In

the Purity Biscuit case, again, the evidence clearly identified the event when the applicant's spinal disc herniated.
Such was identified with respect to time, place, cause and
the connection of the cause to the applicant's employment
activity.

In the instant case, however, the record is

devoid of any such identification.

Moreover, reliance on

the court's reasoning in the Purity Biscuit case is of
doubtful validity since in subsequent cases this court has
chosen to ignore that reasoning and in the Redman case, the
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Court appears to have expressly rejected the Purity Biscuit
case as noted from the following quote:
As to the Purity Biscuit case, it has been a nub
of contention in legal circles, but in its twenty
year life span it has not been overruled apodictically, nor given nourishment by an approbation.
Purity enjoys the unique and doubtful distinction
of being a living corpse.
454 P.2d 283, 286.
See also, Mellen v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
431 P.2d 798 (Utah 1967).
As early as 1922 this Court defined what was required
with respect to the finding of an "accident" for purposes of
recovery under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.

The

Court stated:
What is termed an accident must be something out
of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely
located as to time and place.
If the injury is
incurred gradually in the course of the employment, and because thereof, and there is no
specific event or occurrence known as the start~
ing point, it is held to be an occupational
disease, and not an injury resulting from accidents.
Tintic Milling Company v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 206 P. 278, 281 (Utah 1922).
(Emphasis added).
This definition of accident within the meaning of the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act has been reiterated in the more
recent cases.

In the case of Pintar v. Industrial Commission,

14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414, 415 (1963) this Court stated:
It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensation
that his disability be shown to result, not as
a gradual development because of the nature or
conditions of his work, but from an identifiable
accident or accidents in the course of the employment.
(Emphasis added).
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Perhaps the most definitive and helpful case decided by
this Court dealing with this issue is Redman Warehousing Corp.
v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283
(1969).

In that case, a long haul truck driver noticed a

development of pain in his back while driving between Salt
Lake City and San Francisco.

The evidence was that the mere

sitting and driving of the truck precipitated the protrusion
of the applicant's spinal disc.

In its analysis, this Court

stated:
There is nothing in this record that shows any
unusual event or "accident", if you please, justifying compensability within the nature, intent or
spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
To
conclude otherwise would insure every truck
driver, every railroad engineer, every airplane
pilot and a lot of others, against a physiological
malfunction or physical collapse of any of hundreds
of human organs completely unproven as to cause,
but compensable only by virtue of the happenstance
that the malfunction, collapse or injury occurred
while the employee was on the job, and not home or
elsewhere.
Probably the most recent pronouncement by this court
indicating the need for an identifiable accident to have
occurred in connection with an applicant's employment before
compensation can be awarded is the case of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Industrial Commission,
Case No. 15640, filed January 16, 1979.

In that case the

event which caused a herniation in the applicant's back was
clearly identified as to time and place and such clearly
occurred in connection with the applicant's employment.
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However, this Court vacated an award by the Industrial
Commission since it was found that the particular activity
(rising from a chair to answer a telephone) which caused
the herniation was a normal activity.
Just as in the present case, the L.D.S. Church case
involved no unusual activity or event which could be said to
have caused the condition.

This Court stated:

The only facts relating to the claimed accident
were presented by the testimony of Thurman, and
there is nothing contained therein that warrants a
conclusion that an accident ocurred.
There is
nothing in his testimony that shows anything
unusual about his activities nor shows any unusual
exertion or strain or that shows any contact with
objects or a fall.
There was simply nothing
different about his activities on the day in
question than on any other such working day.
The opinion then continued:
This Court has previously defined the term "accident" arising out of or in the course of employment
as that which "connotes an unanticipated unintended
occurrence different from what would normally be
expected to occur in the usual course of events."
The facts of this case in no way fit that definition.
Simply because the first onset of pain
occurred during working hours, it does not follow
that there is a compensable, "injury".
(Slip
opinion, p. 2).
Thus, the common standard adopted by this Court is as
follows:
1.

The cause of the injury must be an event

which can be identified with respect to time and place.
Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 382 P.2d 414 (Utah 1963);
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Jones v. California Packing, 244 P.2d 640 (Utah 1952).
2.

The cause of the injury must be an event

which is out of the ordinary, unexpected and unintended.

It

must be different from what would normally be expected to
occur in the usual course of events.

Carling v. Industrial

Commission, 399 P.2d 202 (Utah 1965); Thomas Dee Memorial
Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 138 P.2d 233 (Utah 1943).
3.

The cause of the injury must be an event

which can be identified as occurring within the scope of the
applicant's employment.

Nuzum v. Roosendahl, 565 P.2d 1144

(Utah 1977); Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 454 P.2d 283 (Utah 1969).
4.

The injury cannot be the result of a gradual

developing condition even though it is causally related to
the employment.

Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 382 P.2d

414 (Utah 1963); Bamberger Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission,
240 P. 1103 (Utah 1925).
All of the above standards must be met before an injury
is compensable under the Act.
It is clear from a review of the evidence in this case
that the applicant has failed to sustain his burden of proof
in respect to any of the elements, let alone all of them.
The record identifies no back related event which can be
specified with respect to time, place or employment relation-
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ship.

The plaintiff is not shown to have engaged in any

abnormal activity nor was he subjected to any unusual
exertion or stress.
On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that the
claimant's back condition came on as a gradual and developmental problem.

In fact, the record indicates that no ana-

tomical change or breakdown in body structure or function
is identified since both the surgical findings and the
operation report and the discharge summary contained in the
hospital records of July, 1977 indicate that the surgical
procedure revealed that absolutely no abnormalities were
found (R., pp. 84, 88).

This evidence further negates the

happening of any particular accident.
Since no employment related accident is shown in the
record, the Commission would have to speculate even as to
the cause of the applicant's onset of additional back
problems.

Such problems could just as likely have been

caused by or even just become symptomatic from the cold
winter weather or by snow shoveling at home, by housework, or
even a development following various automobile accidents in
which the plaintiff had been involved during the two prior
years (R. pp. 38, 39).
The onset of additional stiffness or soreness in
the back is just as likely to have occurred because of the
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position in which the claimant slept in his bed as by any
particular activity in which he engaged in his work.
Obviously muscle or ligament strains or sprains are not
limited to physical activity which occurs during one's hours
of employment or as the result of employment activities and
unless an applicant can show by some convincing evidence,
the particular cause of such a strain or sprain, then he has
failed in his required burden of proof.

Such speculation

is similar to that discussed in Redman, supra, where this
Court said:
For aught we know from this record there may have
been any number of reasons why the rupture occurred
when and where it did, based on circumstances
quite foreign to the claimant's employment. In
other words there is a complete absence of competent proof here to support any finding with
respect to the cause of the rupture, save by
guesswork. In other words the claimant has not
met the onus of proving an •accident• in the
course of his employment that •causedn the "injury" of which he complains, which brden is his.
454 P.2d at 285.
The mere fact that plaintiff suffered a back problem
concurrently with employment is not enough.

There must be

an accident in "the coursen of employment not just in its
"duration".

Justice Wolf in the Purity Biscuit Company

case , relied upon by plaintiff, commented upon this distinction as follows:
The first requisite for the payment of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is
that the injury which caused the disability must
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have been employment connected. That is to say it
must have been due to an accident which arises out
of or in the course of the employment.
If an
employee is working and while working an outside
agency inflicts an injury it is employment connected because the employment has exposed the
employed to the injury. But compensation cannot
be paid merely because the disability or death
occurred in the duration of the employment.
"In
the course of his employment" connotes more than
in the duration of the employment.
Functions
performed by the employee in furtherance of the
industry in which he is employed must be a material
contributing factor to the death or disability.
201. P.2d at 970.
If the injury is not "employment connected" then the intention
of the Act is destroyed.

If all that is required is that a

person suffers a physical impairment while he is also employed the Workmen's Compensation Act would become a medical
insurance act for all employees.
It is submitted that the medical records contained in
evidence not only fail to aid the plaintiff in his assertion
that an identifiable industrial accident occurred but they
give substantial support to the proposition that the plaintiff
suffered from a preexisting congenital problem.

The applicant

admits to such a condition in his request to change doctors
filed with the Industrial Commission (R., p. 78) and such a
representation is also contained in the medical report of
Dr. Affleck dated June 30, 1977 (R., p. 80).
It is also significant to note the representations of
Dr. Burton in his medical report dated July 5, 1977 in which
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he states npresented with pain in LS spine, when walking or
getting out of a chair . • • " (R., p. 1).
Thus, the Commission had ample evidence in the record
to conclude that the statutory requirement of an "accident"
had not been proven by plaintiff.

The fact that the Commis-

sion chose not to believe plaintiff's explanation for the
back problem does not give rise to error since the Commission
was neither capricious, arbitrary, nor unreasonable in its
action.

Burton v. Industrial Commission, 374 P.2d 439 (Utah

1962).
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD NO DUTY
TO REFER THIS CASE TO A MEDICAL PANEL.
The statutory provision which requires the Industrial
Commission to make reference to the case to a medical panel
mandates such reference of only the "medical aspects of the
case" {§35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended).
Since the Commission denied this application based upon its
finding that no industrial accident was shown to have occurred the medical aspects of the case become irrelevant.
Before becoming involved in medical aspects of a case,
the Commission must first resolve the non-medical questions.
Many applications under the Workmen's Compensation Act are
denied on the grounds that no employer-employee relationship
existed between the parties at the time of the injury.
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Obviously, if such be the determination, then the case can
be properly disposed of without involving a medical panel.
Likewise, such as in this case, many cases are resolved
by a finding that no industrial accident is shown to have
occurred as that term is properly applied to the Workmen's
Compensation Act and thus, again, medical issues need not be
approached which require the reference of such cases to a
medical panel because a consideration· of the medical aspects
of the case would be senseless as well as a waste of time,
money, and effort.
It is only in those cases where a claim is otherwise
found to be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act
that the medical aspects of a case require consideration and
reference to a medical panel is required.

The medical panel

may then address itself to an analysis of the nature and
extent of injuries so as to properly assess liability for
medical expenses, temporary total disability, and permanent
partial disability.
Quite clearly it is not the function of a medical panel
to determine whether or not a compensable accident has occurred within the statutory definition of that term.

Mellen v.

Industrial Commission, 431 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1967).

Such

is the exclusive prerogative of the Industrial Commission.
In any event,

it is clear from the evidence in this case
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that a medical panel would be required to engage in the same
type of speculation as to whether or not an industrial
accident occurred as would the Industrial Commission itself.
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, supra.
Thus, nothing could be gained in this case by requiring the
Industrial Commission to refer it to a medical panel.
POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE
CERTAIN HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF
A DOCTOR'S LETTER.
At the Commission hearing the applicant attempted to
introduce into evidence a letter from Dr. Affleck addressed
to plaintiff's counsel and dated March 15, 1978 (the day
before the hearing)(R., p. 53, Exhibit A-1).

Defendants

objected to placement of the letter into evidence on the
grounds that it was hearsay, that it contained opinion
evidence going to ultimate issues to be decided by the
Commission and the defendants would, by its introduction, be
deprived of their opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Affleck
on its content (R., pp. 24-26).

The administrative law

judge sustained the defendants' objection.
Plaintiff now asserts that the judge's ruling was in
error based upon the provisions of §35-1-88, Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended) which provide that the Commission may receive reports of attending or examining
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physicians into evidence.
In asserting his position, the plaintiff ignores two
important factors.

First, the statute referred to makes the

decision of accepting physician's reports into evidence a
discretionary matter with the Commission.

Secondly, and

most importantly, the plaintiff ignores the distinction
between physician's reports and records generated in his
normal course of treatment and a letter, such as the one
which the plaintiff attempted to introduce in this proceeding, which is obviously generated by counsel to a party for
the purposes of litigation.
Obviously, records and reports of attending physicians
in hospitals generated in the course of treatment are clothed
with a mantle of reliability, thus making their introduction
into evidence less objectionable than other types of hearsay.
As a practical matter both parties to the litigation have
access to those kind of records prior to a Commission hearing and either party has the prerogative of securing the
attendance at the hearing of the involved medical or hospital
personnel should he feel that further clarification of the
content of the record is required.

In instances such as

that now under scrutiny, however, the defendants did not
have that opportunity since the letter in question had not
been made a part of the regular records and reports of the
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treating physician and introduction of the letter would have
prohibited the defendants from cross-examining the witness
on the contents of the letter and the foundational basis
therefor.
Under §88 of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act it is
clear that the Commission has discretion concerning the
introduction of this type of evidence and there is no
showing in this record that such discretion was abused.

The

judge obviously acted correctly to protect the rights of the
parties.
CONCLUSION
There is no showing upon this review that the Industrial
Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in excess of
its authority or that it abused its discretion in finding
that the plaintiff failed in his burden to prove that an
industrial accident occurred which would give rise to the
defendants' liability for workmen's compensation benefits.
Quite to the contrary, the meaningful and persuasive evidence
of record preponderates toward the conclusion that no accident occurred.

The Commission properly refused to speculate

and therefore acted responsibility and wholly within its
authority and discretion.
Having determined that the plaintiff had failed to show
occurrence of an industrial accident, the Industrial Commission was then fully justified in refusing to refer this case
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to a medical panel to evaluate medical aspects of the case
which at that point were irrelevant.

The Commission like-

wise acted properly and within its discretion in connection
with its evidentiary rulings.
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the
Industrial Commission should be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

r----I'Jy,.-J.}-;_L-v( L

j2___

Stuart L. Poelman
Attorneys for Defendants
Kenway Engineering and
Industrial Indemnity
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
File No.
Case No.
DOUGLAS L. SCHMIDT,
Applicant,
vs.
KENWAY ENGINEERING, I!lC., and
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY,
Defendants.
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12-77-8874
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FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER.

*
******************
HEARING:

Hearing Room, Utah Industrial Commission,
350 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on March 16, 1978, at 3:30 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was pursuant to order and
notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law

APPEARANCES:

Applicant was present and was represented
by Jay Meservy, Attorney.

Judge.

Defendants were represented by Stuart L.
Poelman, Attorney.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant, Douglas L. Schmidt, began working for the Defendant
Company October 24, 1976 with the principle duties of cutting steeL to
various sizes according to orders in the shop. The steel pieces which
he must handle vary in weight from a few ounces to 200 pounds. An overhead crane is provided but is not always available since others use the
crane as well which means, on occasions, the applicant must handle larger
steel pieces by himself or with the help of fellow employees. The
application did not specify a date on which an accident occurred but
referred only to February 1977 and the applicant described the accident
by stating: "under the stress of lifting steel daily I developed acute
low back pain". He further alleged that a spinal fusion was necessary
in the low back and that he was temporarily totally disabled from June
22, 1977 and continuously thereafter. The claim was denied on the
grounds that no accident occurred. The Employers First Report of Injury
indicates the accident was reported June 7, 1977. The testimony of the
applicant verified this.
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The only inciden!e the applicant could testify to was an
occasion in December 1976 when he caught his knee cap under a saw
table and hurt the knee cap without any lost time. A few days
later he caught the same knee on a piece of protruding metal and
mentioned the matter to one of his supervisors but did not have any
lost time and specifically stated that he did not particularly notice
any back problems at the time. As to handling steel he spoke generally
about it being a regular occurrence to have someone drop one end of the
steel and leave the other person on the other end to absorb the shock
but related the matter generally to the shop and not to himself
specifically nor did he report any specific instance in which he felt
any adverse effects from it if it did occur. He stated he had some
back pains later in December 1976 and through January his back was
getting quite sore but he made no reports of the matter. He first
visited his family doctor in February but there are no office records
to show the purpose of the visit. Dr. Burton referred him to Dr.
William Dunford who put him in the hospital for an appendix operation.
Without the doctors testimony or the doctors records we can only presume
that the purpose of this visit in February to Dr. Burton was related
more to pains in connection with a problem appendix than it was for any
other matter. On or about June 1, 1977 he visited Dr. Burton about the
back pains and was referred to an orthopedic doctor for the first time.
He was later admitted to the hospital July 18 for a myelogram which was
followed by a spinal fusion operation.
It is essential that the applicant establish that he sustained an
injury as a result of "an identifiable accident or accidents in the
course of his employment" as shown in the attached discussion. In the
Pintar case which is cited in the discussion the court states: "it is
therefore, a prerequisite to compensation that his disability be shown
to result, not as a gradual development because of the nature or condition of his work, but from an identifiable accident or accidents in
the course of the employment". In the Redman case also citeel in the
discussion the court pointed out that there was "a complete absence
of competent proof here to support any finding with respect to the
cause of the rupture, save by guess work". And further stated, "the
claimant has not met the onus of proving an accident in the course of
his employment that caused the injury of which he complains which
burden is his".
The instant case can be compared to both the Pintar case and the
Redman case and the Administrative Law Judge finds that the applicant
has simply not met his barden of proving that an accident occurred
which caused the injury complained of. We further note that there are
no witnesses, no timely reporting and no showing of a relationship
between the injury and the work of the applicant.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The application should be denied.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be and
the same is hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within 15 days of the date hereof specifying
in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah,
~ April , 1978.
ATTEST:

Commission Secretary

J?ei'th E. Sohm,
Administrative Law Judge
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